bilateral investment treaties (BITs), 2 agreements "drafted to address a specific circumstance: that of an investor of one state (the home state) locating assets in the territory of another state (the host)." 3 Many BITs require or allow foreign investors to arbitrate directly against host countries, abrogating sovereign immunity. 4 Investors in such disputes regularly seek damages totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. 5 In short, international investment treaty arbitration (ITA) involves high monetary stakes, implicates issues of international comity, and is here to stay.
Last Term, the Supreme Court of the United States decided BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 6 the first case the Court had ever heard concerning an international arbitration award rendered pursuant to an investment treaty dispute. 7 The case raised factual and legal issues that are likely to recur given the growing popularity of international arbitration. The BIT in question is between two foreign countries-the United Kingdom and Argentina-and provides for final, binding resolution of disputes by international arbitration. 8 The BIT is silent on where arbitration should be held, but contains a clause requiring litigation of disputes in the host-country's courts prior to international arbitration. 9 In 2003, BG Group PLC (BG), a U.K. entity that had invested in Argentina's energy sector, requested arbitration under the BIT against the host country, claiming the Argentine government had expropriated BG's investments in response to a currency crisis. 10 Neither BG nor Argentina litigated the dispute in the Argentine courts prior to BG's request for arbitration. 11 The parties selected the United States as the seat of arbitration, and in 2007, an international arbitral tribunal rendered an award in favor of BG, observing that failure to comply with the litigation requirement in the BIT did not prevent the tribunal from reaching the merits of the dispute. 12 Argentina then petitioned the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to vacate the award on the ground that BG had not accepted Argentina's standing offer to arbitrate contained in the BIT, and thus had not fulfilled the host-country litigation requirement. 13 According to Argentina, the litigation requirement was a condition on its consent to arbitration with an investor. 14 Failing to satisfy the requirement meant the parties had not formed an arbitration agreement and in turn that the arbitral 8 . See Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Arg.-U.K., art. 8(4), Dec. 11, 1990 , http://unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/docs/bits/uk_argentina.pdf [hereinafter Arg.-U.K. BIT] ("The arbitration decision shall be final and binding on both Parties.").
9. See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing article 8(2) of the BIT).
10. See infra notes 99-113 and accompanying text (describing the underlying facts leading to arbitration between BG and Argentina).
11. Infra note 114 and accompanying text. 12. Infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text. Despite agreeing on an arbitral seat, Argentina maintained its position that the parties had not actually formed an agreement to arbitrate. See infra note 114 (noting Argentina's objection).
13. See infra Part III.B (summarizing the district court's opinions).
14. E.g., infra note 173 and accompanying text.
tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. 15 The district court upheld the award, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed and vacated it on appeal. 16 The Supreme Court granted BG's petition for certiorari on the question: "In disputes involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, does a court or instead the arbitrator determine whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied?" 17 Throughout briefing and oral argument, the parties disagreed about which legal principles the Court should apply to determine whether to vacate the award as well as what result should follow under those principles. BG and Argentina argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 18 interpreted through domestic arbitration case law, provided the proper framework, but differed on who should prevail under those authorities. 19 The United States Department of Justice (DOJ), participating as amicus curiae, contended that the Court should engraft an international appendage onto its domestic approach in light of the distinct nature of the case and remand for further proceedings. 20 On March 5, 2014, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit, holding for BG and sending a clear message to the international arbitration community that the jurisprudence the U.S. Supreme Court has developed regarding domestic arbitration extends to its international counterpart. 21 Specifically, if a BIT states that disputes will be resolved by final, binding arbitration and the parties choose the United States as the seat of arbitration or seek to enforce an award pursuant to the BIT in the United States, it is proper for U.S. courts to conclude that the treaty partners REV. 1979 REV. (2014 expected U.S. domestic law on vacatur and enforcement to control. Under U.S. law, courts afford arbitrators significant deference. 22 Accordingly, Part IV.B of this Note contends that countries and investors using ITA, as well as private parties engaging in international commercial arbitration (ICA), will have a better idea of what to expect when they arbitrate or seek to enforce awards in the United States, allowing them to avoid some of the sticky issues that plagued the proceedings between BG and Argentina. 23 But what about Argentina and the text of the treaty, which plainly insists upon host-country litigation prior to arbitration? 24 What about the broader criticism that the current ITA regime shortchanges host-country sovereignty in order to please foreign investors? 25 Or that host-country courts are better positioned than international arbitral tribunals to decide questions of host-country law, even if the arbitrators have the final say? 26 These concerns deserve a response if ITA is to maintain its prominence, notwithstanding the Court's arbitration-friendly decision in BG Group. Part V proposes a novel solution in the form of an improved host-country litigation requirement that stabilizes host-country law at the time of investment. 27 Part VI concludes that countries should learn from BG Group and 22. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 671-72 (2010) ("It is only when [an] arbitrator strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice that his decision may be unenforceable." (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
23. Infra Part IV.B.1-2. 24. See infra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (reproducing and discussing parts of the U.K.-Argentina BIT's dispute-resolution section).
25. See BORN, supra note 4, at 419 (noting that "investment arbitration has generated substantial criticism" and that three countries have recently given notice of withdrawal from a major multilateral treaty, "claiming that investment arbitration erodes national sovereignty and favors foreign investors" (citation omitted)).
26. implement or improve host-country litigation requirements in their BITs. 28 Before addressing the implications of BG Group for international arbitration in the United States and proposing an improved host-country litigation requirement, some context is necessary. Part II provides background on international arbitration and briefly introduces a few of the various sources of applicable law at play, including the role of host-country law and the law of the seat of arbitration. 29 Part III fills an existing gap in the literature by summarizing in depth the BG Group decisions in the lower federal courts, including the important U.S. arbitration precedents relied upon by the parties and courts. 30 Part IV.A builds on the analysis in Part III and draws from the oral argument before the Supreme Court in December 2013 to illuminate the March 2014 decision. 31 
II. Background and Sources of Applicable Law in International Arbitration
Subpart A defines "international arbitration" and distinguishes the two prominent types while highlighting shared issues regarding applicable law. 32 The remaining subparts overview some, but not all, sources of applicable law: the BIT itself, host-country law, rules governing proceedings before the arbitral tribunal, the law of the situs (or seat of arbitration), and the law governing enforcement of awards. 33 
A. International Arbitration Defined
International arbitration is a dispute-resolution mechanism. In its simplest form, "arbitration" involves the submission of a dispute, REV. 1979 REV. (2014 at the request of adverse parties, to a private, independent third party for adjudication. 34 The disputing parties agree they will be bound by the third-party's decision, 35 and to that end, often seek decision makers who are well-respected and possess subject-matter expertise. 36 It bears emphasis that arbitration is a creature of contract. Party consent is a necessary condition. 37 Broadly speaking, "international" encompasses matters that "in some way transcend national boundaries." 38 Different countries' arbitration laws define "international" in different ways. 39 For the purposes of this Note, it is sufficient to point out that the FAA controls which arbitrations conducted in the United States are considered domestic and which are international. 40 Section 202 of the FAA frames which arbitrations are international 41 35. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 2 (explaining that parties to a dispute are bound by an arbitrator's decision because they agree to be, not "because of the coercive power of any State"); BORN, supra note 4, at 5 ("[A]rbitration . . . produces a binding award that decides the parties' dispute in a final manner and is subject only to limited grounds for challenge in national courts.").
36. See BLACKABY & PARTASIDES, supra note 34, at 1 (observing that parties may pick an arbitrator "whose expertise or judgment they trust").
37. See BORN, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that "[i]t is elementary that 'arbitration' is a consensual process that requires the agreement of the parties").
38 There are two major types of international arbitration: international commercial arbitration (ICA) and international investment treaty arbitration (ITA). 43 Stated simply, ICA "involve[s] commercial disputes between privates parties," and ITA typically involves arbitration by an investor against a sovereign country, 44 oftentimes under a BIT. 45 Although ICA and ITA are separate subjects, they overlap considerably. 46 A practical issue that arises in both contexts is which law applies to a particular aspect of a given dispute.
In ICA, arbitrators generally have significant flexibility in determining applicable law, and oftentimes awards rendered in such proceedings will not contain "substantial legal developments beyond the application of general principles of law." 47 Resolution of commercial disputes turns predominantly on "the provisions contained in the agreement of the parties, taking into consideration the facts of the case as they appear from the documents submitted by counsel and the witness hearing." 48 By contrast, ITA requires an arbitral tribunal "to perform very substantial, multi-step, legal work before reaching its final decision." 49 The tribunal must inquire into its jurisdiction to hear the claim and whether the claimant has standing to bring the 43 
B. The Bilateral Investment Treaty Itself
Historically, investments made by foreign entities in other countries carried substantial risk. 53 Under bilateral treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation-precursors to modern BITs-"[t]he primary form of dispute resolution was in local courts" with possible international arbitration between the two countries. 54 That is, investors lacked the ability to arbitrate directly against a host country and instead were frequently required to exhaust local remedies in the host-country's courts, after which they could seek diplomatic aid from their own country if their efforts had not proven fruitful. 55 
C. Host-Country Law
Host-country law retains significance in international investment disputes, notwithstanding the BIT movement and its focus on international law. 59 For example, "the typical definition of an investment found in a BIT requires that the status of the asset claimed to be an investment must be considered under the host State's domestic property law." 60 Unfortunately, BITs do not always provide clear textual guidance on the applicable law, 61 and those that do often fail to address head-on the appropriate balance between international and host-country law. 62 Most can agree that wedding investors to a body of law that is subject to change by the host country at any time is unpalatable, 63 REV. 1979 REV. (2014 Kingdom and Argentina lack a strong textual defense against this possibility. 64 As a result, an investor may include a stabilization clause in a subsequent agreement with the host country concerning the investment. 65 A stabilization clause provides a means for investors to insulate their investments from disadvantageous changes in host-country law. 66 BITs themselves do not typically contain stabilization clauses, perhaps because countries party to the treaty do not want to relinquish the power to alter their laws freely. 67 
D. Rules Governing Arbitral Proceedings
Parties may specify in their agreements or treaties that when a dispute arises arbitration will be conducted on an ad hoc basis or that the parties will seek varying levels of assistance from specialized arbitration institutions. 68 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), created by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966, puts forth texts on various subjects of international trade law, including dispute law may have a severe impact on the investment" and "may go as far as the termination of the contract and the expropriation of the investor's property").
64 resolution. 69 One such text contains the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (UNCITRAL Rules), which are based in part on the notion "that the establishment of rules for ad hoc arbitration that are acceptable in countries with different legal, social and economic systems . . . significantly contribute[s] to the development of harmonious international economic relations." 70 The UNCITRAL Rules provide a procedural framework that parties may invoke wholesale or strategically alter at their agreement. 71 Prominent institutions offering international arbitration services include the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). 72 These institutions do not adjudicate disputes but instead administer disputes initiated under the institution's rules. 73 71. See UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL ARBITRATION RULES art. 1(1) (2010) ("Where parties have agreed that disputes between them in respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, shall be referred to arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, then such disputes shall be settled in accordance with these Rules subject to such modification as the parties may agree."). 
E. The Seat of Arbitration
Once parties have agreed where to arbitrate, the law of the seat of arbitration (law of the situs or lex arbitri) provides procedural rules that parties must follow during arbitration. 75 The lex arbitri also sets forth the grounds on which parties may vacate an arbitral award. 76 In the United States, the FAA grants the U.S. federal district court embracing the location where an award is made the power to vacate the award on certain procedural grounds. 77 Although the Supreme Court has not expressly held that the FAA provides the sole grounds for vacating awards rendered in the United States, recent decisions reflect this understanding. 78 or under "specialized and sui generis dispute resolution mechanisms," such as ICSID).
75. See WAINCYMER, supra note 65, at 147 (explaining that "[t]he law of the Seat or place of arbitration generally plays a central role in arbitral proceedings" and "will, in most cases, form the lex arbitri"). Under such an arrangement, national courts may be tasked with resolving "timing issue Typically, only national courts at the seat of arbitration have the power to vacate or annul awards rendered within a country's borders. 79 Even if an award has not been vacated at the seat, the prevailing party will have to enforce the award if the losing party does not comply voluntarily. 80 
F. Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards
Arbitral tribunals, lacking the coercive power that national courts enjoy, cannot compel compliance with their awards. 81 Fortunately, the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York Convention) 82 REV. 1979 REV. (2014 to the ICSID Convention. 86 For present purposes, it is important to note that the FAA implements the New York Convention's grounds for enforcement of arbitral awards. 87 Unlike vacatur (or annulment) of an award, enforcement may occur in many places. If the country embracing the situs of the arbitration is a party to the New York Convention, the award can be enforced in any other country party to the Convention, subject to limitations imposed by domestic law. 88 An award rendered in an ICSID proceeding imposes a similar obligation and shields awards from national court review. 89 
III. The Issue Presented by BG Group: Litigation Before Arbitration
With some basic principles in mind, this Part III turns to BG Group. A comprehensive discussion of the lower-court decisions and the precedents relied upon sharpens understanding of this complex dispute. Accordingly, after reviewing the underlying facts and arbitral proceedings that led to an award in BG's favor, 91 this Part examines the fight over vacatur and enforcement in the lower federal courts. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia decided not to vacate the award and instead confirmed it. 92 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed. 93 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and heard oral argument in the case on December 2, 2013. 94 The Court issued its opinion on March 5, 2014. 95 
A. Factual Background
Historically, those seeking to invest in a foreign country faced significant hurdles to ensure protection of their investments. 96 The United Kingdom and Argentina signed a bilateral investment treaty on December 11, 1990 to promote cross-border investment and generate economic growth in each country. 97 Article 2 of the BIT protects foreign investments by promising that the investments "shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment and shall enjoy protection and constant security. REV. 1979 REV. (2014 With the BIT and its key provisions in effect, BG Group PLC, a United Kingdom corporation, 99 invested in Argentina. 100 When Argentina privatized its gas industry, BG secured a significant ownership interest in MetroGAS, one of the previously state-run gas utilities. 101 By 1998, BG controlled approximately 45% of MetroGAS. 102 In late 2000, after struggles in Mexico and Brazil, there were rumblings that Argentina might be the next Latin American country to fall victim to a currency crisis. 103 Faced with continuing economic stagnation, Argentina took steps in June 2001 towards delinking the Argentine peso from its strict one-to-one peg to the American dollar. 104 In doing so, the capital in its territory, and, subject to its right to exercise powers conferred by its laws, shall admit such capital. 100. See id. at 47 (concluding that "BG's ownership interest . . . is an 'Investment' for the purposes of Article 1(a)(ii) of the Argentina-U.K. BIT").
101. See id. at 10-12 (explaining Argentina's restructuring of its gas industry for the purposes of privatization, including the creation of several distribution companies, and the successful bid by a group of investors that included BG for ownership of MetroGAS, one of the distribution companies).
102. 105 On January 6, 2002, Argentina "formally abandoned" its peg of the peso to the dollar and devalued its currency. 106 Up until this point, recently privatized gas utilities could collect tariffs 107 and seek adjustments of the tariffs to keep pace with inflation. 108 But in light of Argentina's persistent currency problems, including the move away from its strict peg to the U.S. dollar, the methodology for calculating tariffs became a source of intractable conflict for MetroGAS and its regulators. 109 In fact, BG's main contention in pursuing arbitration was that MetroGAS's inability to increase tariffs and collect the additional revenue put the business in a financially untenable position. 110 Article 8 of the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT lays out the process for settling disputes between an investor and a host country. 111 Article 8(2) states:
[D]isputes shall be submitted to international arbitration in the following cases: 107. See Final Award, supra note 99, at 13-20 (discussing the relevant Argentine "Gas Law," "Gas Decree," and "The MetroGAS License," which formed the regulatory environment for MetroGAS's operations).
108. (i) where, after a period of eighteen months has elapsed from the moment when the dispute was submitted to the competent tribunal of the Contracting Party in whose territory the investment was made, the said tribunal has not given its final decision;
(ii) where the final decision of the aforementioned tribunal has been made but the Parties are still in dispute; On its face, Article 8 contemplates that an investor or State can initiate arbitration only after a period of litigation in the host-country's national court system unless the parties to a dispute agree otherwise. 113 Argentina later filed a separate claim on whether the district court should refuse to deny enforcement of the award pursuant to the "public policy" exception in the New York Convention. 127 The court confirmed the award, 128 explaining that Argentina "failed to identify any fundamental public policy that implicates this country's most basic notions of morality and justice." 129 The court concluded it was bound by the tribunal's interpretation of Article 8(2) of the BIT in determining whether Argentina had consented to arbitration. 130 
C. Reversal and Vacatur of the Award in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
The D.C. Circuit reversed the district court. It determined that Argentina's agreement to arbitrate was conditioned on investors first litigating in Argentina. 131 The circuit court framed two central issues: (1) whether the United Kingdom and Argentina had intended under the BIT that an investor could seek arbitration without first litigating for eighteen months; and (2) whether the countries intended for a court or arbitrator to resolve such a question. 132 138 The arbitral panel determined that it had jurisdiction over the parties and claims and rendered an award in favor of First Options. 139 Although a federal district court refused to vacate the award at the Kaplans' request, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals "agreed with the Kaplans that their dispute was not arbitrable." 140 Thus, the central issues before the Supreme Court were: "(1) how a district court should review an arbitrator's decision that the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute, and question of whether the contracting parties intended the answer to be provided by a court or an arbitrator. 133. 514 U.S. 939 (1995 
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(2) how a court of appeals should review a district court's decision confirming, or refusing to vacate, an arbitration award." 141 Regarding the first issue, the Court explained that "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[e]' evidence that they did so." 142 Here, the Kaplans had not personally signed a contract to arbitrate disputes with First Options, 143 and the fact that they appeared at the arbitration proceedings to protest the arbitrators' jurisdiction did not preclude them from later asserting that they had not agreed to arbitrate arbitrability. 144 Accordingly, the Court found that "First Options cannot show that the Kaplans clearly agreed to have the arbitrators decide . . . the question of arbitrability." 145 In resolving the second issue, the Court declined to fashion a modified standard of review for courts of appeals reviewing district court decisions on whether to vacate an arbitration award under the FAA. 146 Instead, courts of appeals in such instances are instructed to review district court decisions under "ordinary, not special standards," meaning that they "accept[] findings of fact that are not clearly erroneous but decid[e] questions of law de novo." 147 No facts in First Options implicated international concerns. The dispute was wholly domestic. 148 Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit followed this precedent in BG Group, explaining that "the intent of the contracting parties controls whether the answer to the question of arbitrability is to be provided by a court or an 141 arbitrator," 149 and intent must indicate there is "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties sought to "arbitrate arbitrability." 150 As evidence of intent, the D.C. Circuit noted that the text of the BIT did not expressly address the particular facts of the case: when an investor who has not litigated in the host-country's courts as directed by the BIT immediately pursues international arbitration. 151 Accordingly, the court concluded that there was not clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to arbitrate disputes unless an investor had satisfied the litigation requirement of Article 8. 152 In other words, compliance with the litigation requirement was necessary to signal that both BG and Argentina intended to arbitrate any outstanding disputes.
Distinguishing Two Other Domestic Arbitration Precedents
The D.C. Circuit also distinguished its decision from two other precedents. 153 151. See id. at 1371 ("The Treaty does not directly answer whether the contracting parties intended a court or the arbitrator to determine the questions of arbitrability where the precondition of resort to a contracting party's court pursuant to Article 8(1) and (2) 158 the Supreme Court instructed that certain procedural issues do not really constitute independent "questions of arbitrability" and are presumptively for an arbitrator to resolve, not a court. 159 In 155. See id. at 547 ("Here, the question is whether Wiley, which did not itself sign the collective bargaining agreement on which the Union's claim to arbitration depends, is bound at all by the agreement's arbitration provision.").
In John Wiley, a labor union represented about half the employees of a publishing firm. Id. at 545. The union had negotiated a collective bargaining agreement with the publishing firm granting the employees certain rights "such as seniority status, severance pay, etc." Id. 159. See id. at 85 (concluding that the applicability of a time limit rule on seeking arbitration "falls within the class of gateway procedural disputes" that concluding that the particular claims-processing issue in that case was for the arbitrator, the Court attempted to clarify that the First Options framework requiring a court to answer whether there is clear and unmistakable evidence of intent to arbitrate arbitrability is only triggered in certain circumstances, such as when there is "a gateway dispute about whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause" or when there is "disagreement about whether an arbitration clause in a concededly binding contract applies to a particular type of controversy." 160 Outside of such circumstances, certain "'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition," such as whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied, presumptively lie within the power of the arbitrator. 161 In BG Group, the D.C. Circuit reasoned that the issues were substantive questions of arbitrability that a court and not an arbitrator should decide. 162 REV. 1979 REV. (2014 
IV. The Supreme Court's Decision and Its Implications
This Part examines the Supreme Court's March 2014 decision as well as its implications for international arbitration in the United States. Part IV.A briefly overviews how the parties framed the issues before the Court at oral argument; it then distills the main points from the majority and concurring opinions filed in the case. 164 Part IV.B closes with a few observations on the practical impact of the Court's decision on international investment treaty and international commercial arbitration in the United States. 165 
A. Setting the Stage
From the beginning of oral argument, BG parroted language it had used in presenting the question for certiorari: petitioner "ask[s] [the Court] to resolve this case narrowly by reaffirming that an arbitrator rather than a court presumptively resolves a dispute over a precondition to arbitration." 166 167. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 5 (explaining that if the Court takes up the issue of consent, it could do so through three separate strains of analysis). See supra note 159 (explaining that the Howsam Court held that Court were to focus on the international component, 168 the FAA would still compel a ruling in BG's favor because the parties were aware when they agreed to international arbitration in the United States that they were choosing U.S. arbitration law, including case law such as First Options and Howsam. 169 Following BG, DOJ argued as amicus curiae representing the interests of the United States. DOJ asked the Court to vacate the D.C. Circuit's judgment and remand with instructions to apply a modified standard of review. 170 DOJ emphasized the international component of the case, contending that "applying the domestic presumptions that are set forth in Howsam [and First Options] to this type of investor-state arbitration . . . would not be appropriate." 171 DOJ framed the issue as "a question of treaty interpretation, not a question of the likely expectations of parties to a domestic commercial contract." 172 Speaking third, Argentina staked out its position that "[t]his is a contract formation case," in keeping with its contention that its consent to arbitration was conditioned upon BG satisfying the litigation requirement. 173 Argentina noted additionally that after certain procedural questions of arbitrability are presumptively within the power of the arbitrator to decide).
168. Cf. supra note 157 and accompanying text (noting that the D.C. Circuit in BG Group distinguished John Wiley on the basis that the latter concerned domestic labor policy).
169. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 6-7 (acknowledging the United Kingdom and Argentina did not know when signing the Treaty whether a dispute of this nature would be resolved by a court or an arbitrator, "but they d [id] know that the applicable law [would] be the [situs] of the arbitration"); id. at 7 ("[W]e are unaware of any precedent from any country ever that says we are going to not apply our domestic system set of rules, here the Howsam REV. 1979 REV. (2014 an arbitral panel has issued a decision, national courts possess "judicial review" over certain jurisdictional questions, including whether an arbitration agreement was ever formed. 174 Argentina tied the arbitrability question-whether BG had accepted Argentina's offer-back into U.S. case law, arguing that under John Wiley 175 a court decides this type of issue. 176 As noted above, the adverse parties both relied heavily on U.S. domestic arbitration precedents before the Supreme Court. 177 DOJ stressed the international aspect of the case 178 but failed to offer a principled means of distinguishing between treaty provisions that went to "consent" and those that were merely procedural. 179 Viewed against this backdrop, neither the majority's analysis nor its result is surprising.
The Majority Opinion
On March 5, 2014, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court in BG Group, PLC v. Republic of Argentina. 180 The identity precedents and "treaty principles").
174. See id. at 38 (arguing that "whether a contract was ever formed, [or] whether there ever was an agreement to arbitrate [are] ultimately . . . issue [s] for a court to independently de novo decide").
175. For a summary of the pertinent part of the case, see supra note 155. 176. See Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 42 (noting that John Wiley held there is "independent judicial review" when the question concerns "whether there is an agreement to arbitrate at all between the parties"). of the author was telling-Justice Breyer penned the decisions in both First Options 181 and Howsam. 182 His authorship of BG Group signaled from the outset that the Court likely would not depart substantially, if at all, from its domestic precedents. The Justice cast the issue before the Court as follows:
[W]hether a court of the United States, in reviewing an arbitration award made under the [United KingdomArgentina bilateral investment] [t]reaty, should interpret and apply the local litigation requirement [in the BIT] de novo, or with the deference that courts ordinarily owe arbitration decisions. That is to say, who-court or arbitrator-bears primary responsibility for interpreting and applying the local litigation requirement to an underlying controversy? 183 After setting out the factual and procedural background, 184 Justice Breyer explained how the majority, in no more than ten pages in the U.S. Reports, would dispose of a case that had wreaked havoc in every previous forum:
In answering the question, we shall initially treat the document before us as if it were an ordinary contract between private parties. Were that so, we conclude, the matter would be for the arbitrators. We then ask whether the fact that the document in question is a treaty makes a critical difference. We conclude that it does not. 185 Employing the legal fiction that a State-to-State Treaty is "an ordinary contract between private parties" allowed the majority to invoke and apply domestic precedents such as Howsam and First Options without pause. 186 In turn, the majority instructed that under these authorities questions that go to substantive arbitrability, such as "'whether the parties are bound by a given arbitration clause,'" are presumptively for a court to decide. 187 By contrast, "disputes about the meaning and application of particular procedural preconditions for the use of arbitration" are presumptively for the arbitrator. 188 Having laid out the familiar Howsam-First Options formulation, the majority faced little difficulty reaching the conclusion that the host-country litigation requirement in the BIT was of the "procedural[] variety." 189 Relying on the structure of the dispute-resolution section of the BIT, as well as the BIT's mandatory language in connection with resort to international arbitration, the Court reasoned that the litigation requirement "determines when the contractual duty to arbitrate arises, not whether there is a contractual duty to arbitrate at all." 190 Further, nothing in the BIT "give[s] substantive weight to the local court's determinations on the matters at issue between the parties." 191 As such, "the litigation provision is . . . a purely procedural requirement-a claims-processing rule that governs when the arbitration may begin, but not whether it may occur or what its substantive outcome will be on the issues in dispute." 192 According to the majority, this requirement is "highly analogous" to other provisions the Court has deemed procedural in its domestic arbitration precedents. 193 The at 1209 (noting that the Court was "unable to find any other authority or precedent suggesting that the use of the 'consent' label in a treaty should make a critical difference in discerning the parties' intent").
noting that in the present case "we do not now see why the presence of the term 'consent' in a treaty warrants abandoning, or increasing the complexity of, our ordinary intent-determining framework." 196 Although the BIT did contain evidence of contrary intent, that is, a desire to have questions of arbitrability resolved by a court, the evidence was not sufficient to displace the ordinary contract presumption. 197 In sum, the Court articulated that, in matters involving vacatur or enforcement of investment treaty arbitration awards in the United States, arbitrators receive "considerable deference" when interpreting and applying procedural provisions, absent evidence of contrary intent that would displace this presumption. 198 The Court closed: "Consequently, we conclude that the arbitrators' jurisdictional determinations are lawful. The judgment of the Court of Appeals to the contrary is reversed." 199
Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence
One of the chief challenges facing those trying to understand and apply the majority's decision will be determining its breadth. 200 Justice Sotomayor's concurrence provides critical 196. Id. 197 . Id. at 1210 (explaining that a "treaty may contain evidence that show the parties had an intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold issues related to arbitration"). But the Court reasoned that "the text and structure of the litigation requirement . . . make clear that it is a procedural condition precedent to arbitration-a sequential step that a party must follow before giving notice of arbitration." Id. "The Treaty nowhere says that the provision is to operate as a substantive condition on the formation of the arbitration contract, or that it is a matter of such elevated importance that it is to be decided by courts." Id.
198. See id. ("A treaty may contain evidence that shows the parties had an intent contrary to our ordinary presumptions about who should decide threshold issues related to arbitration. But the treaty before us does not show any such contrary intention.").
199. REV. 1979 REV. (2014 insight on this point because it emphasizes the narrowness of the majority's precise holding. 201 Justice Sotomayor "agree [d] with the Court that the local litigation requirement at issue in this case is a procedural precondition to arbitration . . . , not a condition on Argentina's consent to arbitrate . . . ." 202 But the Justice felt it was important to acknowledge that if parties explicitly made such a requirement a condition on consent to arbitration, then the result might be different. She thought it was unnecessary and potentially troublesome for the Court to state in dicta that "a decision by treaty parties to describe a condition as one on their consent to arbitrate is unlikely to be conclusive in deciding whether the parties intended for the condition to be resolved by a court." 203
B. Potential Implications for International Arbitration in the
United States
International Investment Treaty Arbitration
As noted above, the Court's decision in BG Group is its firstever pronouncement on ITA. 204 If it had affirmed the D.C. Circuit, the Court would have signaled to investors and foreign countries that U.S. national courts are keen to intervene when arbitrability issues arise during or following an international arbitration. 205 Such a ruling might have proven a boon for critics who believe international arbitrators wield too much authority in the current ITA regime, 206 but a bane to others who hold sacrosanct the autonomy of the international arbitral tribunal. To reach this result, the Court would have needed to conclude that the litigation requirement constituted a substantive question of arbitrability-a condition on Argentina's consent to arbitratethe fulfillment of which a court should review independently. 207 Instead, the Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and ruled that under existing precedents the district court was correct to confirm the award, indicating that international arbitral awards receive significant deference from U.S. courts on questions of arbitrability. 208 Extending existing domestic precedents might not have been the most elegant solution, but doing so established that questions of arbitrability, whether in domestic or international arbitration, will be reviewed under the same Howsam-First Options formulation. 209 Specifically, it likely means that when a BIT states only an arbitral tribunal has the power to issue final and binding decisions, there is clear and unmistakable evidence under U.S. law that the treaty parties envisioned arbitrators, not a court, would decide whether procedural preconditions to arbitration have been satisfied. 210 As 
International Commercial Arbitration
The decision will also apply to international arbitration in the United States more broadly. As noted above, ITA and ICA draw on many of the same principles. 212 Thus, parties to future international commercial arbitrations in the United States or those trying to enforce ICA awards in the United States will rely on BG Group for guidance. 213 Private parties enjoy the speed and confidentiality that ICA provides. 214 Confidentiality helps parties maintain a working relationship while they resolve disputes without attracting public scrutiny. 215 But if the relationship has soured during a dispute such that one party petitions to vacate an award under the FAA, public court proceedings ensue and both parties lose the benefit of privacy. 216 213. E.g., infra notes 218-21 and accompanying text. 214. See George A. Bermann, The "Gateway" Problem in International Commercial Arbitration, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (2012) (noting that "effective" commercial arbitration typically includes "speed, economy, informality, technical expertise, and avoidance of national fora").
215. See BORN, supra note 4, at 15 (explaining that "most international business prefer, and actively seek, the privacy and confidentiality that the arbitral process offers" because it "focuses the parties on an amicable, businesslike resolution of their disagreements" (footnote omitted)).
216. 223 and the Korean National Oil Corporation (Purchasers) sought to enforce two arbitral awards against Offshore Exploration and Production L.L.C. (Offshore). 224 Offshore is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Houston, Texas. 225 Offshore argued that one of the awards "should be vacated because the arbitral panel incorrectly determined that it had jurisdiction over the dispute underlying the award." 226 But the district court in the Southern District of New York rejected this argument, noting that "[w]hen parties have clearly and unmistakably submitted a disputed issue for arbitration, an arbitral panel's decision should rarely be set aside." 227 The court relied on BG Group to support the proposition that because Offshore did not dispute that the parties agreed to allow the arbitrators to rule on objections to their jurisdiction, "the familiar and deferential standards that apply to judicial review of arbitral awards apply to review of the arbitral panel's determination that it had jurisdiction to issue the . . . Award." 228 As more U.S. lower courts have occasion to consider vacatur and enforcement of ICA awards in the coming years, the citations to BG Group will increase, and parties must understand where certain dispute-resolution provisions fall on the substantiveprocedural arbitrability spectrum.
V. An Improved Host-Country Litigation Requirement
Although U.S. law on ITA may be clearer after BG Group, the question persists: What can Argentina and other similarly situated countries do to more effectively protect their sovereignty in bilateral investments treaties? Commentators have noted that "[i]f investment arbitration is to fulfill its promise [,] . . . some mechanism must be found to promote greater sensitivity to vital host state interests." 229 The answer may be an improved hostcountry litigation requirement:
[A] lot of times nobody think[s] that's going to change anything, but you can understand Argentina or any other country saying, look, before we're going to arbitrate, you know, try our courts, you may find-you may be surprised, right? 230 This Part contends that ITA participants should heed Chief Justice Roberts's admonition to BG at oral argument. 231 Part V.A proposes language that treaty drafters should consider drawing from or incorporating if they wish to create or restructure a dispute-resolution mechanism that includes a host-country litigation requirement. 232 Part V.B explains how the proposed language avoids specific problems that arose in BG Group and asserts that an improved litigation requirement combats the broader criticism that the current ITA regime does not adequately protect host-country sovereignty. 233 
A. Proposed Language to Consider
The language below is not intended to be lifted from the page and stuck directly into the dispute-resolution section of a bilateral investment treaty. As with any agreement, the unique bargaining positions and goals of the contracting parties will heavily inform the drafting of the document, including the 230. Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 11 (questioning of BG by Chief Justice Roberts).
231. See also BG Grp., PLC v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1219 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) ("It is no trifling matter for a sovereign nation to subject itself to suit by private parties; we do not presume that any countryincluding our own-takes that step lightly." (citation omitted)).
232. 238 With that in mind, the language below seeks to generate ideas on how treaty partners can incorporate a host-country litigation requirement that increases respect for national sovereignty and aids arbitrators in later proceedings while still affording investments sufficient protection:
All disputes shall be finally resolved by international arbitration. Prior to arbitration, the complaining party shall submit the dispute to the national courts of the country in which the investment is located. During these proceedings, the parties to the dispute shall undertake good-faith efforts to brief factual issues occurring or having occurred in the host country and legal issues involving host-country law. The courts shall apply the host-country law in effect at the time the investment was made, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
Upon the earlier of a dispositive decision by a host-country court or eighteenth months, either party to the dispute may request arbitration. Before issuing a final award, the arbitral tribunal shall review findings of fact and legal determinations concerning host-country law made by the host-country's courts. The arbitral tribunal shall apply the host-country law in effect at the time the investment was made, unless the parties to the dispute agree otherwise.
The arbitral tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear any objections that the above requirement to litigate in the hostcountry's courts has not been satisfied.
B. Avoiding the Pitfalls in BG Group and Addressing Broader Criticisms of the International Investment Treaty Arbitration Regime
Good-Faith Obligation
Throughout the proceedings, BG contended that nothing productive would have come from litigating in the Argentine courts prior to arbitration. 239 That may be true under the letter of the United Kingdom-Argentina BIT because it does not require that the parties litigate vigorously or until a court issues a decision, only that the parties to the dispute maintain a case in the Argentine courts for eighteen months. 240 By including a good-faith obligation to litigate, the proposed language incentivizes investors and host countries to develop a record in the host-country's courts. 241 Even if they do not, there is still recourse to arbitration after a period of time. 242 239. See, e.g., Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 57-58 (suggesting that BG could have simply filed in the Argentine courts and then waited eighteen months without doing anything else to fulfill the litigation requirement).
240. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (laying out the disputeresolution section from the BIT); Or. Arg. Tr., supra note 166, at 45-47 (questioning whether the eighteen-month requirement was really useful for the parties and a condition on consent to arbitration when BG could have simply filed a suit in the courts and "ke[pt] it alive perfunctorily" to satisfy the requirement).
241. See MCLACHLAN ET AL., supra note 59, at 70 ("At time tribunals will have to consider findings of domestic law by national courts, tribunals, or regulatory bodies on the status of investments in domestic legal systems."). "[I]n the absence of any evidence that the findings are tainted by some lack of due process, deference should be shown to decisions of domestic courts or tribunals." 
Stabilization of Applicable Host-Country Law
Effective usage of stabilization clauses in individual commercial agreements between foreign investors and countries inspires their inclusion here. 243 During development of the record in the host-country courts, the stabilization clauses protect investors from adverse changes in host-country law. 244 The proposed language freezes applicable host-country law for the purposes of litigation and arbitration at that which is in effect when an investment is made. It ensures that the host country cannot legislate to the detriment of investors after an investment is made, a fundamental goal of BITs. 245 Accordingly, investors would be able to learn on the front-end the contours of the domestic law that will apply if a dispute arises. For example, in disputes involving regulatory expropriation by the host country, the investor could point to the text of the BIT to support its position on applicable host-country law rather than hoping an arbitral tribunal will later discard the litigation requirement because it believes the host country impeded the investor's ability to litigate in the courts, as was the case in BG Group. 246 Instead of stabilizing the law at the time the treaty is signed for all investments ever made under the BIT, the proposed language freezes host-country law at the time of investment for particular investments, allowing the host country to retain more legislative flexibility. 247 243. Supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 244. See supra Part II.C (describing the role of host-country law in international arbitration).
245. See VANDEVELDE, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that a goal of BITs generally is the "stabilizing effect . . . of preserving a particular set of host state policies"). "The role of the BIT . . . is to stabilize . . . obligations, either to reassure investors or to prevent an easy reversal of the underlying policies, and to publicize the stabilization." Id.
246. Supra note 118 and accompanying text. 247. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (suggesting that countries typically refrain from including stabilization clauses in treaties).
